prevalence of autism spectrum disorders is now estimated at between 0.3% and 0.7%. The increase of diagnosed cases in recent years can be accounted for by Autism is a disorder that affects many cognitive funcIn this review, I will discuss a productive and successful, tions; however, it does not imply a global information though still controversial, theory of autism. This theory processing deficiency (Scheuffgen et al., 2000). While attempts to explain the social and communication failure the hallmark of the disorder is a failure of social commuthat is the very core of autistic disorder. The cognitive nication, this does not imply a global lack of social abilcause for this failure is assumed to be "mind blindness." ity. Rather, autism appears to be caused by one or more This concept presupposes that normal individuals have specific, i.e., circumscribed, cognitive deficits. At the the capacity to "mind read," that is, to attribute mental same time, such modular deficits would have developstates to self and other. This is referred to as the "theory mental repercussions on general adaptive functioning of mind" or "mentalizing." The theory assumes that this (Frith and Happé , 1998). This is in line with current ideas capacity, far from being the product of complex logical about innate domain-specific mechanisms with a cirinference, rests on a dedicated neurocognitive mechacumscribed basis in the brain (for a discussion of current nism. I will review the evidence that this mechanism is theories see Black, 1998). Arguably the most relevant impaired in both severe and mild forms of autism. Its of these deficits in the origin of autism is a subtle but putative neural basis can give clues to the underlying devastating deficit in human social insight, on which brain abnormalities in autism. this review will focus. This can be referred to as the mind blindness hypothesis (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
practicing back bending and finger moving? The imporspecific social environment will tune it up and get it into action. The main purpose of an innate start-up mechatant point of the example is that for an instantaneous interpretation of ordinary behavior, we automatically nism is that it should lead to fast learning about the properties of its domain, with culture shaping the contake account of the mental state of people, their desires, and their beliefs. tent of the knowledge that is acquired. The development of the social brain involves many other processes as well, such as the perception of faces, voices, and moveThe Cognitive Basis of Mind Reading ments of conspecifics, and these may well be prerequi- Leslie (1987) proposed that the ability to represent mensites for the development of mentalizing. tal states is based on a dedicated cognitive mechanism.
Sensitivity and learning about the inner states of This mechanism includes a "decoupler" and an "expresagents starts early and proceeds rapidly. Early signs of sion raiser" and transforms primary representations (imsuch sensitivity are seen in the phenomenon of shared pressions of the physical world) into secondary repreattention (Carpenter et al., 1998) . Children in the first sentations. These are "decoupled" from reality and year of life automatically follow another person's gaze, raised into expressions "in quotes." They can thus be seemingly attending to the other person's focus of interattached to an agent's intentional stance; for example, est. Shared attention is accompanied by other signs agent A believes, desires, etc., that "x is the case." Menof mentalizing. For instance, referential looking, where talizing can thus be conceived of as representing an children check the mother's expressive attitude toward agent's propositional attitude to states in the world, thus a novel object before approaching or avoiding it (Repakeeping apart someone's attitude to states in the world choli, 1998). The ability to imitate complex and arbitrary and actual states in the world. This is why children are but intentional actions of others-as opposed to their not confused when their mother holds a banana to her accidental actions-is another sign of the inexorable face and pretends it is a telephone.
progress of mentalizing ability and is achieved in the According to Leslie (1987) , the first florid manifestation middle of the second year of life (Meltzoff, 1995) . of the ability to mentalize is seen in the young child's Young children aged 2-3 years learn to understand enjoyment of pretence, from around 18 months. Here and use mental state verbs (want, know, pretend) before the child acts as if realizing that when mother is using they learn color names (Bretherton, 1992). Mentalizing a banana as a telephone, she is taking a propositional ability is also important as a facilitator of learning in attitude to a particular object, which does not interfere other domains. For instance, according to Bloom (2000) , with the child's learning about real telephones and real mentalizing has a critical function in enabling children bananas. The implications of this proposal are radical:
to learn the meanings of words. Thus, children don't a neural system is required that supports the processing learn words by mere association of word sound and of specific information in relation to agents and is not object in view. Such association is inherently ambiguous tied to a particular modality. If there is such a system and error prone, as speaker and listener may look at in the normal case, then we can envisage this system different objects. Instead, children learn by tracking the being dysfunctional from birth, resulting in a difficulty speaker's referential intention, for example, by taking with the intentional stance. This difficulty would result into account the speaker's gaze (Baldwin et al. 1996) . in mind blindness.
The effortless ease with which children as young as 5 The development of this radical proposal as a neuro-(and usually before 8 years of age) acquire advanced cognitive theory owed much to the timely coincidence concepts such as false belief, deception, white lie, and of some highly novel ideas and experiments in the late double bluff is remarkable. 1970s and early 1980s. They concerned the need to explain understanding of mental states, such as beliefs, in the chimpanzee (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) and Experimental Studies of Mentalizing Failure in young children (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) . Likewise, in Autism there was the need to explain the spontaneous enjoyThe mind blindness theory predicts that the milestones ment of make believe in infancy (Leslie, 1987) . At the of the normal development of mentalizing should be same time, it had been documented that young children absent at the appropriate age in young children with with autism lacked spontaneous make-believe play autism. In particular, they should fail to follow another (Wing and Gould, 1979 ing mechanism, may be lacking in autism. For instance, nally devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983) , who showed that normally developing children aged 4 and preschool children with autism did not show a preference for speech over nonspeech stimuli as do other above passed this test. In the Sally-Ann task, shown in Figure 1 , the following children (Klin, 1991) . Nor do older children show a spontaneous preference for facial expressions over other scenario is enacted either with two dolls or two real people: Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. Sally salient stimuli, such as hats (Hobson, 1993). Face recognition difficulties are common throughout the autism puts a marble into her basket, and then she goes out for a walk. While she is outside, naughty Anne takes the spectrum, perhaps because of a lack of social interest early in life. In a neuroimaging study, Schultz et al. (2000) marble from the basket and puts it into her own box. Now Sally comes back from her walk and wants to play found that brain activation patterns in adults with autism did not distinguish between faces and objects, in conwith her marble. Where will she look for the marble? The answer seems obvious to a 4 year old child: Sally will trast to normal adults.
The mind blindness hypothesis was originally prolook inside her basket. Why? Because that is where Sally thinks it is. The marble is really in Anne's box, but posed and tested by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985, 1986) . The argument was that if the social impairment in autism Sally doesn't know this. She was not there when Anne transferred the marble. Children with autism, with a menarises from a failure of the mentalizing mechanism as conceptualized by Leslie (1987) , then children with autal age of 4 years and above, had difficulty with this task. Unlike normally developing children, and unlike tism should be unable to represent mental states such as beliefs. They should be unable to understand and children with Down syndrome, they indicated that Sally would look in Anne's box. predict behavior in terms of someone's belief even when having achieved the appropriate level of verbal and cog-
The inability of children with autism to understand false belief tasks at the appropriate age has been connitive development. The test was a false belief task origi- . Thus, a deficit in mentalizing can False belief tasks are deceptively simple, but they tap many different abilities and can be solved in different account parsimoniously for the core impairments in socialization, communication, and imagination that charways. The mind blindness hypothesis is often misunderstood as meaning that people with autism do not posacterize the autism spectrum. At the same time, it is specific enough to predict unimpaired function in other sess an explicit theory of mind and never can possess such a theory. Instead, the hypothesis is about the faildomains, assuming there were no additional cognitive deficits. In fact, there are other deficits. ure of the mentalizing start-up mechanism, not about a "theory." Despite a dysfunctional start-up mechanism,
The mind blindness hypothesis has never claimed to account for the presence of repetitive behavior and narable individuals with autism, and especially those with Asperger syndrome, can come to understand mental row obsessively pursued interests in autism. It cannot account for motor problems, perceptual processing states through compensatory learning. However, not only do they acquire this understanding late, but they anomalies, or the commonly found superior rote memory skills. Other theories address these features (Russell, are slow and error prone on more advanced mentalizing tasks.
1998; Happé , 1999). However, mind blindness may be able to explain some of the language abnormalities. In If success on false belief tasks is not always easy to interpret, neither is failure. The mentalizing deficit autism, muteness, language delay, echoing of speech, and idiosyncratic use of language are highly typical feahypothesis predicts failure on the Sally-Anne and similar tasks, but there are many other reasons for failure. For tures. Even in cases of age-appropriate or precocious appearance of language, a defining feature of Asperger instance, the Sally-Anne test requires working memory and the ability to inhibit reality-oriented responses, i.e., disorder, parental observations suggest that the first words were often unusual and that vocabulary acquisipointing to the place where the object really is. For a convincing demonstration, it is necessary to show tion was different from that in normally developing children. To investigate the apparently odd pattern of word success on a task that is in every respect the same but that does not involve thinking about mental states. a new word. They demonstrated that children with auwho can make the appropriate allowances for mind blindness can still be a rich source of experience and tism made errors in mapping the word to the object that they happened to be looking at at the time, showing learning. Alternative views of the social impairment in autism mere association learning. Control children matched for mental age did not make such errors, but instead have often focused on emotional dysfunction. Studies by Hobson (1993) and Sigman and colleagues (see Sigmapped the word to the object that the speaker was looking at. To be guided by the speaker's referential man and Capps, 1997) suggest that children with autism are less responsive to the emotions displayed by others. intention is a sign of mentalizing, and its absence in autism goes some way toward explaining the unusual For instance, they show little concern when an adult cries out in pain, pretending to be hurt, except when development of language in autism.
What of those individuals without the benefit of a starttheir attention was strongly engaged. On the other hand, contrary to popular belief, failure of bonding or attachup mechanism, who learn about mental states through conscious effort? Slow learning based on forming assoment does not appear to be a distinguishing characteristic of autism in early childhood. Attachment would ciations between behavior and outcomes will allow the gradual acquisition of mental state concepts. In everyappear to be one of those components of social cognition that are dissociable from mentalizing. It is possible day life, many individuals with autistic disorder show that they have learned the rules of social convention, that responsiveness to specific emotions is another dissociable social component. with autism are impaired when having to interpret complex social emotions from faces rather than simple basic show the location of the average peak activations in the emotions. Individuals on the severe extreme of the ausix studies quoted above. The figures also show peak tism spectrum may never make deliberate eye contact activations in these same regions obtained in other and perhaps may not distinguish between biological highly relevant imaging studies, which can inform us agents and mechanical objects. This severe form of the about the function of these regions and how they might condition is characterized by a degree of social detachcontribute to the ability to mentalize. ment that exists over and above mind blindness. HowWhy these particular regions and what do they have ever, global asocial behavior is not the rule in autism in common? Clearly, the system identified is tailor-made spectrum disorders. . In all these studies, a network of brain regions was identified that was ing, mocking). In another condition, the triangles moved randomly. This was the contrast that was used to highlight the mentalizing system. During mentalizing, the for processing the intentions of biological agents. As autism group showed less activation than the controls Figure 5 shows, the same space of the medial frontal in the three previously identified brain regions. However, region is also activated by tasks that imply awareness they showed identical activation during mentalizing in of the self. As Figure 6 shows, the superior temporal one additional region, the occipital gyrus. The activation sulcus, mainly on the right, is also activated by tasks that of this region suggests that both groups devoted more require detection of biological agents. The neuropsychological studies to date suggest that the medial prefrontal cortex may be necessary for menThere is also evidence from the few existing histoanatomical studies of autistic brains for abnormalities in talizing, but it seems unlikely that it is also sufficient. For lesions in other regions identified as part of the these particular brain regions. For example, Bauman and Kemper (1994), in an important series of studies, mentalizing system in brain imaging studies, data are as yet too sparse. Other lesion cases too could be inforreported cellular abnormalities in post mortem brains of individuals with autistic disorder, in particular, reduced mative, in particular in the cerebellum, which has been found to be active during mentalizing in at least some neuronal cell size and increased cell packing density in regions of the limbic system comprising the hippocamof the few extant studies. In summary, the results from neuropsychological, pal complex, subiculum, entorhinal cortex, amygdala, mamillary body, medial septal nucleus, and anterior cinstructural, and functional imaging studies to date, together with findings on cellular abnormalities in autistic gulate. Outside the limbic system, reduced numbers of Purkinje cells were found in the posterior and inferior brains, provide some converging evidence for the critical brain abnormalities leading to mind blindness. regions of the cerebellum. Experimental evidence shows that the typical social precision grip). Intriguingly, a neuron in anterior cingucommunication impairment of autism can be well exlate cortex (close to the area with peak activations in plained by impairment in the mentalizing mechanism. mentalizing studies [ Figure 5 ]) in a patient undergoing Able individuals with autism spectrum disorders can neurosurgery was found to respond when the patient with time and practice achieve awareness of mental received a pinprick and also when he watched pinpricks states by compensatory learning. In normally develto the examiner's fingers (Hutchison et al. 1999) . It is oping children, the mentalizing mechanism allows fast plausible that mirror mechanisms form an early evolulearning of socially and culturally transmitted knowltionary link to mentalizing. Speculatively, their function edge, including the meaning of words. Since children underpins not only the automatic computation of an with autism spectrum disorders can be very intelligent agent's goal directed actions, but of an agent's intention and can learn by other means, the underlying brain abtoward the self (prey or predator; friend or foe). normality must be sufficiently specific and circumHowever, the detection of agency still does not get us scribed so as not to compromise general information anywhere near the ability to mentalize. How and where processing ability. This has implications for a modular might this task be accomplished by neurons? The meview of the development of cognitive functions. dial frontal cortex, in particular the most anterior part of the paracingulate cortex, is a promising candidate for
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